THE FAILURE TO INTERCEPT: TIMELINE AND OVER 50 QUESTIONS THE 9/11 COMMISSION PART II SHOULD ASK HIGH OFFICIALS

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"Two senior experts with Mossad... were sent to Washington [on] August [23, 2001] to alert the CIA and FBI to the existence of a cell of as many of 200 terrorists said to be preparing a big operation [and that] large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American mainland were imminent."

> September 16, 2001, The Telegraph, 'Israeli security issued urgent warning to CIA of large-scale terror attacks'. As can be seen below, 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta, henchman Marwan al-Shehhi and Flight 77 terrorist Khalid al-Midhar all had been on the radar of the Mossad for months. Apparently four 9/11 terrorists were among the 200 provided.

"Mossad [team] leader, Hanan Serfati, had rented several dwellings. "One of Serfati's apartments was located ... in Hollywood, [Florida,] right near the apartment of [9/11 ringleader Mohammed] Atta and [Marwam] al-Shehi.", French intelligence reported later. Everything indicates that the terrorists were constantly observed by the Israelis. The chief Israeli agent was staying right near the post office where the terrorists had a mailbox. The Mossad also had its sights on Atta's [Flight 77] accomplice Khalid al-Midhar, with whom the CIA was also familiar, but allowed to run free. The Mossad apparently warned their American counterparts several times about the terrorists, especially about al-Midhar."

October 14, 2002, Die Zeit, 'Tür an Tür mit Mohammed Atta' (based on unreleased French intelligence report) (PDF with translation).

"The decades-old procedure for a quick response by the nation's air defense had been changed in June of 2001. Now, instead of NORAD's military commanders being able to issue the command to launch fighter jets, approval had to be sought from the civilian Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. This change is extremely significant, because Mr. Rumsfeld claims to have been "out of the loop" nearly the entire morning of 9/11. ... The families of the vanished bodies and unsettled souls of 9/11 are still waiting to have the dots connected."

June 21, 2004, New York Observer, '9/11 Tapes Reveal Ground Personnel Muffled Attacks'

"We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information [about this non-existent phantom aircraft]. ... This response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense. ... No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77. ... FAA headquarters [didn't] pass any of the information it had about United 93 to the military... Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area [which was already wrong] as instructed, but east over the ocean [which was double wrong]. ... The President told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach key officials [but initially refused to talk to Rice] ... [At 9:46] staff reported that they were still trying to locate Secretary Rumsfeld [then on the Pentagon lawn]... The President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for the first time that morning shortly after 10:00. No one can recall the content of this conversation..."

2004, 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 26-27, 30, 34, 38, 40, 43. Just some of the failures that went on the morning of 9/11.

"How is it that civilians in a hijacked plane were able to communicate with their loved ones, grasp a totally new kind of enemy ... yet the president had "communication problems" on Air Force One and the nation's defense chief didn't know what was going on until the horror was all over? ... Why wasn't Rumsfeld able

to see on TV what millions of civilians already knew? After the Pentagon was attacked, why did he run outside to play medic instead of moving to the command center and taking charge? ... So far, no one has been fired, which leaves the 9/11 families - and all of us - in a conundrum. The inaction of both the president and the Defense chief under the ultimate test offer little reassurance [in this new world]..."

> August 13, 2004, Los Angeles Times, 'Rumsfeld and Bush Failed Us on Sept. 11'.

Intro

Probably the best way to quickly become familiar with the 9/11 event is through a detailed timeline. Such a timeline has been created below, supplemented with all the questions surrounding the failure to intercept the hijacked airliners. There was a lot of confusion over this in the years after 9/11, and if we're honest, even the 9/11 Commission of 2004 left way too many questions open to consider this area of investigation closed. It's a huge upgrade compared to what was available before, but it's simply not enough. We need another 9/11 Commission, one that is willing to dig much deeper.

Ideally fully written out sources would have been provided with each and every question, but time restraints don't allow for this. However, the vast majority of these questions can be spotted simply when reading the first chapter of the 9/11 Commission Report,,, which is only about 40 pages long. The intercept failures are easier to understand and less explosive than the 10,000 page NIST report on the World Trade Center collapses, so that's another good reason why one might want to study this aspect of the event first. Remember, the 9/11 Commission and NIST investigation should be seen as wholly separate.

Oversight of routes flown



JeJet fighters on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) were roughly 45 minutes too late in New York City and Washington, D.C. Incredibly, apparently Andrews Air Force Base had no planes on QRA. Also notice how the QRA fighters at Langley (2) first fly east over the ocean by accident, then were sent to the Baltimore area by accident, and even then take the tourist route towards the Pentagon. People should have been fired and if the 9/11 Commission had dug for answers even a little bit, Bush would never have been re-elected in 2004. But the elections of George W. Bush are a whole other matter...

A timeline of unprecedented failure

8:14 a.m.	Flight 11 fails to respond	For unknown reasons, none of the planes will transmit the code "7500", indicating that they are being hijacked. Still, in an ideal situation NORAD bases with F-15 and F-16 jets on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), which have to be airborne within 15 minutes, would be contacted within 5-6 minutes of losing radio contact, the transponder signal and going off course.
8:20 a.m.	FAA top (possibly) first aware of the Flight 11 hijacking	According to FAA operations manager Ben Sliney to the 9/11 Commission, no later than this point he is informed by a superior that *"a hijack [is] in progress. ... At that point the aircraft on the TSD was 100 miles orso west of Boston."* This reported notification of a hijack might be about 5-8 minutes too soon, with the FAA only realizing a hijack after Flight 77 turned off its transponder and sharply veered towards New York City.

8:21 a.m.	Flight 11 turns off transponder	This makes it necessary to rely on radar returns from this point on. Ben Sliney of the FAA's radar system gave an interview to Chud.com on April 18, 2006 and explained: *"The command center doesn't see real time traffic. They see a composite of all the computer hosts - each [FAA] center has a host computer - that from the actual radar returns generates a target on the scope for the controller. The command center gets a composite of all of those hosts three or four minutes later, and there were no [fighter] planes in the vicinity [of Flight 93] that we could see that were under our [military] control [and could have shot down FLight 93], and certainly not at that altitude."*
8:24 a.m.	"We have some planes"	Mohammed Atta can be heard saying: *"We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you'll be okay. We are returning to the airport. Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet."* At this point Boston Center operators are certain that Flight 11 has been hijacked. They don't hear the *"some planes"* part.
8:28 a.m.	FAA Boston Center calls FAA Command Center about a possibly hijacking	By this time Flight 11 has taken a dramatic turn toward New York City.
8:32 a.m.	FAA headquarters is aware of the hijacking	9/11 Commission: *"The duty officer [at FAA headquarters] replied that security personnel at headquarters had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conference call with the New England regional office. FAA headquarters began to follow the hijack protocol, but did not contact the NMCC to request a fighter escort."* Conference calls between different FAA centers are set up in minutes without problems. Protocol states that FAA headquarters should have informed

		the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon. In turn, the NMCC would contact NORAD, with the secretary of defense giving permission to launch QRA jets to NORAD commanders, a fascinating change of a long-standing protocol instated in June 2001. Just as fascinating, secretary of defense Rumsfeld is "missing" that morning. In addition, the FAA's top hijack coordinator, former Bin Laden hunter General Mike Canavan, is not present at FAA headquarters; he's out of the country.
8:38 a.m.	FAA Boston Center contacts NORAD	FAA Boston Center itself takes instant action and contacts NORAD directly. 9/11 Commission: *"Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS [NORAD region]. This was the first notification received by the military - at any level - that American 11 had been hijacked."* NORAD immediately relays the message to battle commander Colonel Robert Marr at Otis AFB.
8:42 a.m.	Flight 175 signs of trouble	This is about the time that it crosses paths with the already hijacked and supposedly pursued Flight 11.
8:46 a.m.	Flight 11 hits the North Tower	32 minutes after being hijacked. Impact at floors 94-98. NORAD is still trying to locate Flight 11 from its primary radar returns.
8:51 a.m.	Flight 77 signs of trouble	It starts to deviate from its course, but Indianapolis Center flight controllers are not aware of the issues with Flight 11 and 175. Flight 77 will eventually hit the Pentagon.

8:53 a.m.	Unofficial NORAD warning to South Tower employees	Major Don Arias, public affairs officer of the 1st Air Force and NORAD's Continental United States Region at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, has just been informed by NEADS of a hijacked airliner when he sees the smoking North Tower on CNN. He calls his brother Adam at the 84th floor of the South Tower to warn him that it's likely another plane is on its way to the WTC. Adam Aryas warns everyone in the office, even throws out some colleagues by force (rescuing them in the process), but he himself is killed as the South Tower collapses.
8:53 a.m.	F-15s take off from Otis	Officially they take off at 8:46, but radar only reveals their presence in the air at 8:53. Otis is located 190 miles from New York City. The planes are only scrambled in the first place because NORAD commander, General Larry Arnold, told battle commander Robert Marr of Otis Air Force Base: *"Go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get authorities later."* Apparently since June 2001 he has to wait for Donald Rumsfeld to scramble jets. Unfortunately, at this point NORAD doesn't yet know precisely where to send the jets to. Apparently the FAA's Boston Center is not on the line anymore and it was taken for granted that hijacked airliners keep their transponders on.
8:55 a.m.	Roughly the time Bush is first informed	Bush, who has just arrived at the Booker Elementary School in Florida, reacts extremely lax to the impact of the first plane, in complete contrast to everyone else present in his entourage. He immediatly speculates that it must have been an accident and suggests the pilot is terrible or must have had a heart attack. According to one person present, Bush even blatantly refuses to take a call from his national security advisor Condoleezza Rice, prefering instead to have a chat with the welcoming

		committee, which had just been informed that Bush couldn't speak to them because of the phone call. His chief of staff, Andy Card, literally has to grab his arm after several minutes and tell him: *"Mr. President, you need to take this call right now."*[1] 9/11 Commission report, p. 35: *"At 8:55, before entering the classroom, the President spoke to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice..."* She informed about the crash, which he had already heard about a few minutes before. While maybe the secretary of defense could issue shoot-down orders on his own (it's vague) and with NORAD commanders explaining that in cases of emergency, they would have taken unilateral action on 9/11 without the president's approval [2], it is clear from explanations given by senior military commanders that they were all looking to the president in case a civilian airliner had to be shot down.[3]
9:01 a.m.	FAA Command Center informed of Flight 175 hijacking	FAA New York Center to the FAA Command Center: *"We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us.... We're, we're involved with something else, we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here."*
9:02 a.m.	"We have some planes" desciphered	Boston Center to New England Center: *"As far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy said that "we have planes." Now, I don't know if it was because it was the accent, or if there's more than one, but I'm gonna, I'm gonna reconfirm that for you, and I'll get back to you real quick. Okay?"* The FAA's Command Center is informed at 9:05.
9:03 a.m.	Flight 175 hits the South Tower	Impact occurs 22 minutes after the first hijacking. Impact is at floors 78-

		84. The fighters from Otis are positioned off the coast of New York in a holding pattern, because NORAD doesn't know precisely where to scramble them to.
9:03 a.m.	FAA New York Center contacts NORAD	This is another breach of protocol as the security division of FAA headquarters should be contacting NORAD. There is no evidence that headquarters is doing anything.
9:04 a.m.	Bush and Rumsfeld break protocol	Upon hearing of the second impact, Karl Rove has to scramble the halls of Booker Elementary School in search of a television set, which, unusually, has not been brought along in the presidential motorcade. Bush ignores protocol by refusing to leave the school, against the wishes of his security personnel and his location being public knowledge. In essence, he puts himself and everyone around him in danger, including all the children at the school. At this same moment, Donald Rumsfeld comes out of a meeting at the Pentagon. When he learns about the second crash he and his top military aide, the influential Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, disappear to their respective offices *"to work, keeping their eyes on television sets that showed the World Trade Center in flames."* [4] Instead, Rumsfeld should have gone to the NMCC down the hall and made contact with Bush. Personnel at the NMCC is soon looking for him, because they need his authorization to launch any counter-operations against the hijackings in coordination with the FAA. Apparently no one can find him in his office, nor reach him on his phone until the impact of Flight 77. [5]
9:05 a.m.	FAA Boston Center instructs pilots to secure cockpits; Command Center doesn't do the same	9/11 Commission report, p. 23: *"Within minutes of the second impact, Boston Center instructed its controllers to inform all aircraft in its airspace of the events in New*

		York and to advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston Center asked the Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide. We have found no evidence to suggest that the Command Center acted on this request or issued any type of cockpit security alert."
9:13 a.m.	F-15s send to New York	The Otis fighters are still located 115 miles (185 km) away, flying in a holding pattern over the ocean. 9/11 Commission report, p. 23, NEADS mission crew commander: *"We need to talk to FAA. We need to tell 'em if this stuff is gonna keep on going, we need to take those fighters, put 'em over Manhattan. That's best thing..."*
9:15 a.m.	Bush has left the classroom	Takes about two minutes to say goodbye. White House logs reveal he got in touch with Cheney at 9:15. He also talks to national security advisor Condoleezza Rice, New York Governor George Pataki and FBI director Robert Mueller. Unexplained communication problems prevent Bush from speaking to one or more of these individuals in detail.
9:21 a.m.	FAA informs NORAD about phantom aircraft	9/11 Commission report, p. 26: *"FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report [from FAA headquarters] that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards - heading towards Washington. ... It was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower. That's the latest report we have. ... I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south."*
9:23 a.m.	NORAD orders Langley AFB F-16s in the air	Langley Air Force Base is located roughly 100 miles (160 km) south-east of Washington, D.C. It will take a few minutes before they are airborne.
9:24 a.m.	FAA headquarters is informed of Flight 77	9/11 Commission report, pp. 24-25: *"At 9:09, [FAA Indianapolis Center] reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this information to FAA*

		headquarters at 9:24. By 9:20,Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircraft, and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed. ... By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field facilities, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77. They feared it had been hijacked. At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headquarters of the situation. ... Between 8:56 and 9:05, this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controllers at Indianapolis Center. The reasons are technical, arising from the way the software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar coverage where American 77 was flying. ... Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes... "
9:25 a.m.	F-15s arrive over New York	By this time NORAD is worried about refueling the planes, so the planes remain over New York and are not send to Washington, D.C. Most likely they would have arrived a few minutes earlier than the Langley fighters, but not a whole lot sooner.
9:28 a.m.	Flight 93 is hijacked	The FAA's Cleveland Center hears screaming on board, with the plane descending some 700 feet. The airliner will eventually crash in Pennsylvania.
9:30 a.m.	First public speech of Bush	He's doing this at Booker Elementary School, surrounded by children. Good thing the hijackers weren't flying around in Cessna-size airplanes in Florida anymore.
9:30 a.m.	Langley F-16s in the air	They are scrambled towards Baltimore, which is the wrong direction. At 9:21 FAA headquarters in Washington, D.C. told NORAD that Flight 11, in reality a *"phantom*

		aircraft", was still airborne and headed from New York City towards Washington, D.C. The 9/11 Commission: *"Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne. We have been unable to identify the source of this mistaken FAA information. ... This response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single public timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense. The inaccurate accounts [also by NORAD officials] created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logical response to an actual hijacked aircraft."*
9:33 a.m.	Secret Service informed that a plane (Flight 77) is coming in and moves Cheney to bunker	9/11 Commission report, pp. 39-40: *"At 9:33, the tower supervisor at Reagan National Airport picked up a hotline to the Secret Service and told the Service's operations center that "an aircraft [is] coming at you and not talking with us." This was the first specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the White House. No move was made to evacuate the Vice President at this time. As the officer who took the call explained, "[I was] about to push the alert button when the tower advised that the aircraft was turning south and approaching Reagan National Airport." American 77 began turning south, away from the White House, at 9:34. It continued heading south for roughly a minute, before turning west and beginning to circle back. This news prompted the Secret Service to order the immediate evacuation of the Vice President just before 9:36. Agents propelled him out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker. The Vice President entered the underground tunnel leading to the shelter at 9:37.209 Once inside, Vice President Cheney and the agents*

		paused in an area of the tunnel that had a secure phone, a bench, and television. The Vice President asked to speak to the President, but it took time for the call to be connected." It took more than half an hour before shoot-down orders would be issued.
9:34 a.m.	FAA Washington Center informs NORAD about the missing Flight 77	43 minutes after Flight 77's hijacking, the FAA Washington Center tells NORAD: *"We're looking - "we also lost American 77."* According to the 9/11 Commission: *"No one at FAA headquarters ever asked for military assistance with American 77."*
9:34 a.m.	FAA headquarters learns that Flight 93 is hijacked	It is informed by Cleveland Center, which noticed the first signs of a hijacking 6 minutes earlier. The hijackers of Flight 93 repeatedly state that they have a bomb on board.
9:36 a.m.	FAA informs NORAD about a plane close to Washington	9/11 Commission report, p. 27: *"At 9:36, the FAA's Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discovery about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington: "Latest report. Aircraft VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast [note: wrong] of the White House.... Six, southwest. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away." This startling news prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate control of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters:"Okay, we're going to turn it ... crank it up. ... Run them to the White House." He then discovered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north toward the Baltimore area as instructed, but east over the ocean."I don't care how many windows you break," he said."Damn it... Okay. Push them back.""* In other words, all hopes to intercept Flight 77 are dashed with this discovery. The primary reason for NORAD planes flying out over the ocean is because this is standard operating procedure

		when they are not provided with a specific target.
9:38 a.m.	Flight 77 hits the Pentagon	This is 47 minutes after Flight 77's hijacking and having flown over downtown Washington, D.C. and very close to Andrews Air Force Base, which apparently has no fighters on QRA. The Langley fighters are still 150 miles (240 km) away.
9:39 a.m.	All planes are ordered to the ground	At this point secretary of transportation Norman Mineta, located in the White House bunker with Cheney and Rice, orders all 4,400 airplanes in U.S. airspace to the ground. The order goes from Mineta to FAA deputy administrator Monte Belger, to FAA operations manager Ben Sliney, who relays the order to the pilots around 9:43 a.m.
9:43 a.m.	Bush boards Air Force One	Bush is unable to reach Washington from his limousine and a cellphone he borrows, with trouble continuing aboard Air Force One. According to the 9/11 Commission, *"The President told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that morning. He could not reach key officials, including Secretary Rumsfeld, for a period of time. The line to the White House shelter conference room and the Vice President kept cutting off."* Despite that, press secretary Ari Fleischer notes for 9:45 a.m. that Bush tells Cheney over the phone: *"Sounds like we have a minor war going on here. I heard about the Pentagon. We're at war - somebody's going to pay."* It appears that an attitude of total indifference, followed by an immediate desire for retaliation, preceeded the issuing of any shootdown orders by quite some time.
9:49 a.m.	FAA HQ continues to fail to request military assistance	9/11 Commission: *"At 9:49, 13 minutes after [the FAA's] Cleveland Center had asked about getting military help, the Command Center [national operations manager was Ben Sliney, his first day on the job, but with a lot of previous experience*

		at the FAA] suggested that someone at headquarters should decide whether to request military assistance: FAA Headquarters: "They're pulling Jeff away to go talk about United 93." Command Center: "Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling aircraft?" FAA Headquarters: "Oh, God, I don't know." Command Center: "Uh, that's a decision somebody's gonna have to make probably in the next ten minutes." FAA Headquarters: "Uh, ya know everybody just left the room." ... At 9:53, FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that the deputy director for air traffic services was talking to Monte Belger about scrambling." FAA headquarters does not inform NORAD or the NMCC until after the crash of Flight 93. Monte Belger had an open line with secretary of transportation Norman Mineta, located at the White House bunker with Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice.
9:52 a.m.	Lynn Cheney arrives in White House bunker	9/11 Commission report, p. 40: *"The Secret Service logged Mrs. Cheney's arrival at the White House at 9:52, and she joined her husband in the tunnel. According to contemporaneous notes, at 9:55 the Vice President was still on the phone with the President advising that three planes were missing and one had hit the Pentagon.We believe this is the same call in which the Vice President urged the President not to return to Washington. She finds her husband in the tunnel towards the conference room, still talking to the president."* No shoot down order is issued.
9:58 a.m.	Cheney enters conference room of White House bunker	His wife is with him. Condoleezza Rice arrives around the same time.
9:59 a.m.	South Tower collapse	56 minutes after impact.

Â±10:00 a.m.	Langley fighters arrive over Washington, D.C.	9/11 Commission report, p. 465: *"According to radar data, the fighters from Langley Air Force Base arrived over Washington at about 10:00 A.M. Two of the three Langley fighters were fully armed (i.e., with missiles and guns); the third fighter carried only guns."* As late as 10:10 they receive a specific order from NORAD to not engage aircraft.
Â±10:00 a.m.	Unconfirmed call between Cheney and Bush	9/11 Commission report, pp. 40-41: *"The Vice President recalled being told, just after his arrival, that the Air Force was trying to establish a combat air patrol [CAP] over Washington. The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. He said the President signed off on that concept [apparently ordered shoot-downs]. The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot. The President emphasized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. The Vice President's military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice,who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President,"Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10. ... Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning,*

		there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room."
10:02 a.m.	Secret Service made aware of Flight 93 and informs NMCC	9/11 Commission report, p. 42: *"The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. It, in turn, was [informally] informed by the Secret Service's contacts with the FAA. NORAD had no information either. At 10:07, its representative on the air threat conference call stated that NORAD had "no indication of a hijack heading to DC at this time.""*
10:03 a.m.	Rumsfeld finally talks to Bush	According to the 9/11 Commission: *"The President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for the first time that morning shortly after 10:00. No one can recall the content of this conversation, but it was a brief call in which the subject of shootdown authority was not discussed."*
10:03 a.m.	Crash of Flight 93	35 minutes after hijacking, without FAA headquarters taking any action to inform the military (only at 10:15, 8 minutes after the regional Cleveland Center). Only at this point does the NMCC, which Rumsfeld should have been in charge of, learn that Flight 93 was hijacked. NORAD still doesn't know anything. 9/11 Commission: *"The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. It, in turn, was informed by the Secret Service's contacts with the FAA. NORAD had no information either. At 10:07, its*

		representative on the air threat conference call stated that NORAD had "no indication of a hijack heading to DC at this time.""
Â±10:13 a.m.	Cheney gives a shoot-down order, supposedly with authorization from Bush	9/11 Commission report, p. 41: *"At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft - presumably hijacked - heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania. At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice President and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out. Vice President Cheney was asked for authority to engage the aircraft. His reaction was described by Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, "in about the time it takes a batter to decide to swing." The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage the inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conversation with the President. The military aide returned a few minutes later, probably between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He again asked for authorization to engage.The Vice President again said yes."*
10:14 a.m.	Cheney's shoot-down order is relayed to the NMCC	9/11 Commission report, p. 42: *"Repeatedly between 10:14 and 10:19, a lieutenant colonel at the White House relayed to the NMCC that the Vice President had confirmed fighters were cleared to engage inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircraft was hijacked."*

10:14 a.m.	Pentagon collapse	The collapse can be seen live on air from closeby. It doesn't generate any panic among rescue workers and firefighters standing nearby and also very little excitement from reporters. The roof above the impacted area is leaning against an intact portion of the Pentagon. It simply snaps at 10:14 a.m. and slides down, without explosions or other anomalies being heard.
10:18 a.m.	Bush gives shootdown orders	According to the 9/11 Commission: *"At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment," suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order [he had given]. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President... The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a two-minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary."* This is over two hours after the first signs of trouble with Flight 11. It will take another 10 minutes for the order to reach senior officers of NORAD. By this time, all four hijacked airliners have already crashed.
10:28 a.m.	North Tower collapse	102 minutes after impact.
10:31 a.m.	NORAD relays shootdown order of Cheney	9/11 Commission report, p. 42: *"It is not clear how the shootdown order was communicated within NORAD. But we know that at 10:31, General Larry Arnold instructed his staff to broadcast the following over a NORAD instant messaging system: "10:31 Vice president has cleared to*

		us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot them down if they do not respond per [General Arnold]."
10:39 a.m.	Rumsfeld finding his bearings	According to the 9/11 Commission: *"Secretary Rumsfeld told us he was just gaining situational awareness when he spoke with the Vice President at 10:39..."*
5:20 a.m.	WTC 7 collapse	A loud rumble is heard, the penthouse collapses through the building, and a few seconds later the bottom floor caves out with the buildings sinking into its own footprint.

Basic conclusions on timeline

Throughout its report, the 9/11 Commission strongly relies on the assumption that the June 1, 2001 directive J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was operational on 9/11. [6] This policy specified the key roles of the secretary of defense, the FAA hijack coordinator and the president of the United States in countering any airliner hijackings:

> *"In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA. The NMCC will, with the exception of immediate responses as authorized by reference d, forward requests for DOD assistance to the Secretary of Defense [Rumsfeld] for approval. ...*
>
> *"When notified that military escort aircraft are needed in conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or USELEMNORAD to determine if suitable aircraft are available and forward the request to the Secretary of Defense for approval...*
>
> *"When the military can provide escort aircraft, the NMCC will advise the FAA hijack coordinator [Canavan] of the identification and location of the squadron tasked to provide escort aircraft. NMCC will then authorize direct coordination between FAA and the designated military unit. ...*
>
> *"If destruction is required, the DDO, NMCC will, forward all requests or proposals for DOD military assistance to the DOD Executive Secretary and appropriate OSD staff offices, and then to the Secretary of Defense... [who should receive permission from President Bush]"*

Considering Rumsfeld, Canavan and Bush were precisely those individuals completely "out of the loop" on 9/11, one can see why this might raise a few eyebrows. The fact that the 9/11 Commission doesn't

explicitly address this coincidence should be considered suspect. However, to make matters even more confusing: it appears the above policy was still largely a theoretical construct when 9/11 occurred. As far as we can tell, and as has been confirmed by FAA operations manager Ben Sliney, on 9/11, the traditional system in which regional FAA centers were contacting local NORAD sites directly, was still solidly in place. [7] FAA headquarters actually was the least active of all relevant government bodies on 9/11, its responses to the attacks much slower than NORAD, the Pentagon, or even the Secret Service. It is very clear that the FAA's General Mike Canavan hadn't implemented these new procedures at all.

To summarize, at its core the 9/11 Commission failed to:

1. explicitly point out the coincidence that the three key individuals in intercepting the hijacked airplanes all miserably failed on 9/11;
2. explain to what extent J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A had been activated and rehearsed on 9/11.

Considering it makes a huge difference as to what policy was active on 9/11, a new 9/11 Commission might first want to focus on explaining these questions. From there, numerous other questions can be asked also. These are all listed below.

Additional questions for NORAD

1. According to mainstream information, QRA intercepts happened at a rate of almost 400 times per year in the early 1990s. After the reduction to 7 sites, each with two jets, in the late 1990s, they still occurred roughly twice per week right up to 9/11. [8] What are the details of these intercepts with regard to protocol/chain of command and reaction time?

2. Who exactly was responsible for the failure to redirect QRA jets, normally aimed at planes coming in from overseas, toward threats emerging from over the mainland?

3. Why were no QRA jets available at Andrews Air Force Base, right next to the nation's capital, a primary target for every terrorist in the world? Terrorists of various convictions have tried to target the White House and other buildings with airliners and small airplanes since at least 1974. [9] What message does it send to world when the world's greatest superpower leaves its capital without air cover?

4. NORAD's Langley interceptors accidentally flew east over the ocean while they should have been heading to the north-west, towards Washington, D.C. This was standard operating procedure when pilots were scrambled but not provided with a target. How could

this mistake happen, as any commander at any level should be aware of this basic procedure? Who is responsible?

5. Why weren't the pilots of the Langley jets provided with information on their target? Who is responsible for that?

Additional questions for the FAA and General Mike Canavan

1. Why did the FAA's Command Center not issue a nationwide cockpit security alert, as its Boston Center advised at 9:05 a.m.? This occurred 23 minutes before Flight 93 was hijacked.

2. What was the crucial security division at FAA headquarters doing against the hijackings? While aware of the first hijacking at an early stage, it appears this division was completely paralyzed on 9/11.

3. Who was General Mike Canavan's designate while he was out of the country? [10]

4. How close is Canavan to Rumsfeld? Did he have a hand in the revisions?

5. How is it possible that Canavan was not aware of an October 2000 NORAD exercise involving a terrorist flying into the United Nations headquarters with a Fedex plane? [11]

6. After stalling for nearly two hours, why did the FAA sent a person with zero authority to act as the FAA coordinator at a conference call with NORAD and the Pentagon with officials trying to stop additional incoming planes?

7. Why did regional Boston and New York centers of the FAA, against protocol, directly contact NORAD to ask for intercepts? Shouldn't they have coordinated first with the security division at FAA headquarters?

8. Who within the FAA was responsible for the mistaken information that Flight 11 was still airborne and heading toward Washington? Why couldn't the 9/11 Commission figure this out?

9. Why did FAA headquarters never ask for military assistance with Flight 93? They were aware of its hijacking for 47 minutes before informing the NORAD and the Pentagon that they needed interceptor jets. This was well after the Flight 93 had crashed.

10. Considering he failed so dismally on 9/11, shouldn't we have all possible details of Canavan's history as a JSOC commander and Osama bin Laden hunter, working alongside the CIA Counterterrorism Center? [12]

11. Why did Canavan begin to stutter when asked what he knew about the response on 9/11? [13] And why hadn't he informed himself afterward about any of these details through his subordinates or colleagues, some of them the president's closest national security advisors? [14]

12. Canavan actually stated to the 9/11 Commission: *"I take full responsibility for any and all FAA security failures on 11 September 2001."* [15] Is it acceptable that his extreme failure was rewarded with a position as counter-terrorism manager of Bechtel? [16] Is it acceptable that his FAA boss Jane Garvey was invited to join the board of the MITRE defense corporation? Essentially both benefited from their failure to prevent 9/11.

Additional questions for Bush and Cheney

1. Why did the Bush administration, the second it entered into office in January 2001, ban the FBI and military intelligence from investigating any U.S.-based members of the Bin Laden family on suspicions of Jihadi activities? [17]

2. Why were both Bush and Cheney so opposed to a congressional inquiry into 9/11, apart from the stupid excuse that it supposedly took resources away from the War on Terror?

3. Why did Bush and Cheney refuse to provide the 9/11 Commission with the meager $11 million buddget it asked for, instead only providing it with $3 million?

4. Why did Bush refuse to testify to the 9/11 Commission without Cheney being present at his side in a closed session? Why did they think it was acceptable to not be placed under oath and that no recording would be made? Why did they think it was acceptable to suppress notes of the 9/11 Commission under the guise of national security? Doesn't all of this make them look incredibly guilty?

5. Why did Bush refuse to hand over his daily intelligence briefings to the 9/11 Commission? Is this an acceptable decision?

6. Why did Bush threaten the entire world in his November 10, 2001 United Nations speech with the words: *"Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories concerning the attacks of September the 11th; malicious lies that attempt to shift the blame away from the terrorists themselves, away from the guilty."*

7. Why did the Bush administration order the 9/11 Commission to lock away information on Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi intelligence agent who aided some of the 9/11 hijackers and was taking money from the wife of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, a.k.a. "Bandar Bush" for his close friendship with the Bush family?

8. Why was Bush apparently the only one in his entourage not worried about the first World Trade Center impact as a potential deliberate attack?

9. Why did Bush refuse to talk to his national security advisor Condoleezza Rice for several minutes, while his advisors were pushing him to do that. Why was this fact not reported by any of his staff to the 9/11 Commission?

10. Why did Bush not break off his classroom reading after being informed of the second impact?

11. Why didn't Bush listen to his security detail and allow himself to be evacuated, as protocol stated?

12. Didn't Bush put his staff, teachers and 300 children in danger by staying in a location that was public knowledge beforehand?

13. Instead of rewriting an already prepared speech to the nation at 9:30 a.m., shouldn't Bush have been more concerned with staying on top of the crisis and issuing shoot-down orders, just in case any other hijacked planes were inbound?

14. Who is responsible for the failure to include a television set with the Bush motorcade, something which should always be present?

15. What is the reason of the persistent communication problems Bush encountered in his limousine, with the cell phone he borrowed from his chief of staff Andy Card, and aboard Air Force One?

16. Why didn't Bush issue shoot-down orders to Cheney at 9:15 a.m., after the two WTC impacts, and later, just after the Pentagon crash

at 9:37? Why didn't he even discuss them with Rumsfeld just after 10:00?

17. Why did Bush refuse to testify in front of the 9/11 Commission without Cheney at his side? And why only in a closed, secret session?

18. Is it acceptable that both Bush and Rumsfeld couldn't remember any details of their conversation that took place just after 10:00 a.m.?

19. What were the exact contents of his conversations with Cheney? Did they contain anything that wasn't available through CNN?

20. Why were "vice-presidential" shoot-down orders issued to the NMCC and NORAD based on an interpretation of Cheney with Bush in a conversation that couldn't be confirmed as having taken place? If he was so certain that the president ordered the shoot-down, he could have just stated it was the president's order.

21. Bush should be asked about his father's key involvement in the Safari Club, a private CIA network of Frank Carlucci, Richard Helms, Ted Shackley and Saudis as Prince Turki al Faisal and Bandar Bush. He should also be asked about his father's alleged involvement in the October Surprise, CIA drugs-for-arms trafficking, and various other scandals.

22. What about Cheney's KBR Halliburton secret partnership from 1998 on with the Russian-Ukrainian GRU firm Far West, Ltd., linked to the Shamil Basayev, the person accused of the Russian Apartment Bombings; the Al Qaeda leadership, the CIA and Saudis as Prince Turki al Faisal and Adnan Khashoggi; as well as to Afghan opium trafficking, assassinations, the arming of Iran with KH-55 cruise missiles before 9/11, and the international arms trade in general?

Additional questions for Rumsfeld

1. To what extent did Rumsfeld personally have a hand in the new hijacking protocols as specified in the June 1, 2001 directive J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A, placing him and General Mike Canavan in control of counter-measures against airplane hijackings?

2. Did this protocol really mean that Rumsfeld himself needed to grant authorization to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) and NORAD for something simple as scrambling aircraft toward

suspected hijacked planes? If so, why were NORAD commanders stripped from this authority? Couldn't they be trusted? And can't regional FAA centers not be trusted to call NORAD for help? Assuming personnel is properly trained, these measures centralize control at the expense of efficiency.

3. Did this new protocol really entail that he, Rumsfeld, became the second person in the United States with the independent authority to order shoot-downs of civilian airliners?

4. What was Rumsfeld thinking when he remained in his office after the second plane impact and even couldn't be reached on the phone or found by the NMCC leadership? At 10:39 a.m., when still trying to gain his *"situational awareness"*, he acknowledged that his *"primary concern was ensuring that the pilots had a clear understanding of their rules of engagement."* Why didn't he have that concern at 9:00 a.m. or just after 10:00 a.m. when speaking with Bush? Should he have been defense minister if he is that easily confused by a situation?

5. Why did he claim to be too old to be evacuated to a secure site at the time of the second plane impact, yet rushes out after the Pentagon crash and can be seen hauling debris and/or wounded persons?

6. Why did he see it as his job to join the rescue efforts in the midst of the most massive terrorist attack on the United States? An attack in which his presence at the NMCC is crucial in order to launch a counter-attack and prevent more casualties?

7. Wasn't he warned by anyone on the Pentagon lawn that joining the rescue efforts might be too dangerous for a 69-year-old defense secretary, considering there is a chance of secondary explosions, NBC-type payloads, and more incoming planes? If I were present with him on the Pentagon lawn, the first question I would have asked is: *"Sir, shouldn't you be defending the country in case more planes are inbound?"* Most likely everyone except Rumsfeld and his cronies wonder about that question.

8. Is it acceptable that both Bush and Rumsfeld couldn't remember any details of their conversation around 10:00 a.m.?

9. Should Rumsfeld have been fired over these failures?

10. Rumsfeld should explain everything about his relationship with Frank Carlucci, the former CIA deputy director and Carlyle

chairman who was meeting a half brother of Osama bin Laden on 9/11, along with George H.W. Bush and James Baker. All these men are part of the modern-day Safari Club network.

Additional questions for Norman Mineta

1. Why didn't the 9/11 Commission clear up the testimony of Norman Mineta, who claimed to arrive at the White House bunker at 9:20 a.m. and to have seen Cheney there already having issued shoot-down orders for Flight 77? There's every indication that Cheney didn't arrive until about 9:58 and that the orders were for Flight 93, based on a projected non-real time path.

2. How is it possible that Mineta remembers arriving at the bunker at the time of the unspecified Cheney order regarding Flight 77, how he remembers Flight 77 closing in from 50 miles out to 10 miles out, how he and Belger subsequently learn about the Flight 77 impact in the Pentagon, how he issues the order to Belger to ground all planes in the U.S. as a result, while, in reality, Cheney and his military aide weren't even in the room! Mineta specifically explained that he and Cheney were trying to figure out if the Pentagon had shot down Flight 93. How is it possible that Mineta's account is so unbelievably off? Is it a deliberate attempt to confuse the 9/11 Truth movement?

3. Should Mineta be examined for symptoms of Alzheimer or other memory-impairing illnesses?

4. Shouldn't it be investigated if Mineta has purposely given an inaccurate account to provide additional fuel for conspiracy theories? His account has been used to claim that A) Cheney issued early shoot-down order and; B) Cheney was secretly in control of Operation 9/11 and issued a stand-down order.

5. Shouldn't Mineta eventually be reprimanded or even be prosecuted for having given a highly inaccurate timeline and not having shown any interest in correcting it afterward? In a later interview with We Are Change Mineta expressed complete ignorance of the 9/11 Commission report and still believed Cheney arrived at the White House bunker way before 10:00 a.m. Of course, We Are Change didn't take him through the entire timeline, so the additional interview accomplished nothing.

Additional questions for the FBI, CIA, NSA, Mossad

1. In February 2001 it was reported that the CIA and NSA had *"fully mapped"* the terrorist network of Osama bin Laden and were *"trashing bin Laden's accounts"* with just *"three key strokes, and it's gone."* [18] How does this information jive with Osama bin Laden having half a dozen hijackers training within the United States in preparation of the biggest terrorist attack the world has ever seen?

2. On August 23, 2001 [19], just weeks before 9/11, two Mossad officers came to CIA headquarters to warn *"that large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American mainland were imminent."* [20] What are the exact details of this warning? Who were the suspects? Which *"highly visible targets"* were specified?

3. This question becomes even more important upon learning, primarily from the German Die Zeit newspaper (in turn through an obtained French intelligence report), that the Mossad spying controversy actually involved an operation in which one Mossad cell was spying on 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta and sidekick Marwan al-Shehhi in Hollywood, Florida after this pair arrived here in early to mid 2000, with various warnings being provided to the CIA not just about Atta and Al-Shehhi, but also about Flight 77 hijacker Khalid al-Mihdhar. [21] As already mentioned, the latter came into the country from California and was housed by a Saudi intelligence agent paid by the wife of Bandar Bush.

4. Does this information mean that an October 2002 story floated in the Washington Post was bogus? The one in which *"an array of U.S. officials"* dismissed the whole Israeli spy probe as a conspiracy theory of a lone, *"angry"* DEA employee? [22] This is the case with near certainty, because there is just too much public information pointing in the direction of elaborate Israeli spy rings having operated inside the United States. [23]

5. Most important, which aspects of the Israeli spy rings inside the United States were shadowing the future 9/11 hijackers and which ones had other assignments? Did the breakup of these Israeli spy rings effectively shield the would-be 9/11 hijackers? This is especially important to ask in light of the fact that the spy operation on Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi by a Mossad team under the leadership of "Hanan Serfati" was broken up in April 2001, months before 9/11. [24] Did another Mossad team replace the one of Serfati?

Additional questions for the original 9/11 Commission

1. Why did the 9/11 Commission not publicly loudly protest over Bush and Cheney's extreme stonewalling and attempts to prevent being heard themselves by the commission? Why did the commission accept, for example, that Bush and Cheney were allowed to testify together, in closed session, without being placed under oath, without recording being made, and the commission's notes being censored by the White House? Isn't this the most ridiculous contempt for democracy ever displayed in modern times by a president and vice-president?

2. Why did the 9/11 Commission not question the events at the WTC, especially the evidence for molten steel?

3. Why did the 9/11 Commission not ask the FBI for better footage of Flight 77's crash into the Pentagon?

4. Why did the 9/11 Commission blatantly dismiss the testimony of NORAD commander General Ralph Eberhart that Flight 93, and even all other planes, could have been intercepted if only NORAD had been informed sooner? [25]

5. Why do the original chairman and vice chairman of the 9/11 Commission, as well as their follow ups, two more 9/11 Commission members and its executive director all appear on ISGP's independently-established Superclass Index? This is important, because it means all these individuals are deeply involved in the superclass/ supranational NGO network. In other words, these individuals cannot be considered independent.

6. Why did the 9/11 Commission not expose in more detail the ties between leading Saudi Arabian officials and the 9/11 hijackers?

7. Why did the 9/11 Commission, and superclass member and 9/11 Commission chair Thomas Kean in particular, deny any knowledge of the reported ties between Pakistani ISI general Mahmud Ahmed and the 9/11 hijackers, whom he reportedly financed to the tune of $100,000 through Saeed Sheikh right before 9/11? [26] Did he do this for the same reason that the White House censored this information? [27]

8. Why was the 9/11 Commission so lax? Why did it leave all these questions unanswered?

9. Why did the dissenting 9/11 Commission member, Senator Max Cleland, question little about 9/11 itself, primarily backing Richard Clark against the neocon agenda? [28]

Notes

1. April 8, 2002, Jason Safdie for The Hatchet (gwhatchet.com), 'Meet Adam Putnam, the youngest congressman in office': *"Now 27, Rep. Adam Putnam (R-Fla.) is the youngest member of the 107th Congress. Hailing from Florida's 12th congressional district, he graduated from the University Florida in 1995, where he was named Outstanding Male Graduate of the Year. Prior to starting his first term in Congress on Jan. 3, 2001, Putnam served in the Florida legislature. ... Putnam sat down with The Hatchet March 14 to discuss everything from his experience with President George W. Bush the morning of September 11 to life as a Florida Gator. Hatchet: I understand that on September 11 you were with the president. You were with him at the elementary school, and you were with him on Air Force One. Can you tell us about that? Putnam: We were in Sarasota waiting for him to arrive at the school. I was on the greeting committee with about six other people. They came to us and said, "You've got a phone call from National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. When he (Bush) arrives, and he'll be here in a minute, he's going to walk past you. He's not being rude; he's just got to take this phone call." So they arrived, and his whole entourage steps out. Then everyone's cell phones and beepers just start going off; everybody scatters out to have his or her conversation. Well, he comes up and does not go past us. He stops and talks with us, having a good chat with the Teacher of the Year. Then White House Chief of Staff Andy Card called and said, "Mr. President. You have a phone call from National Security Adviser Rice you need to take." He (Bush) says OK. Goes on talking with the Teacher of the Year. "I'll be right there." Card comes back to him, grabs him by the arm and says: "Mr. President, you need to take this call right now." And that was word of the first plane to hit. They certainly thought that it was unusual and likely not an accident. There was really not a whole lot of information at that time, so the schedule didn't change. He (Bush) moved on to the second grade class and read to them, then he got word of the second plane hitting with that terrible image we all have. The president was then told America was under attack. At that point everything changed. The interesting thing about that day, and I think it says a lot about the country, is that it was Education Day for the president. He was there to speak to 300 fifth graders and tell them what a great job they had done on their standardized tests. He*

didn't have his defense folks with him. He didn't have his intelligence advisers with him. He had his education staff with him. His staff was saying, "Mr. President, you have got to say something to the nation. This is a huge issue." This was about three and half minutes after we had gotten word of the attacks. The media center was already setup, and you have the 300 fifth graders spit and polished just waiting to see the president of the United States. ... So anyway, we rushed back to the airport and took off. We were headed back to Washington when we found out about the Pentagon being hit. Then the decision was made to divert the flight to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. He (Bush) was very calm. All of us were pretty rabid. He was angry, understandably, but very much in control, and the whole system worked. The fact that we were going to Shreveport was a big secret. Bush told us, he told members of Congress, but not the press, it was supposed to be top secret. But the funny thing was, as we were flying into Shreveport, we were able to get their TV signals. The national news was on, then the local news broke in and said, "We have just received word that Air Force One is landing in our town. The president is here." (Everyone laughs). That did not make us feel terribly secure. Bush went on to Offut (Air Force Base). There was a backup Air Force One, and we came back to Andrews Air Force Base in Washington. We landed in Washington at what should have been rush hour and there were not more than 10 cars on the road between Andrews and Washington. The Capitol was just locked down. It was the eeriest part of the day."

2. *) 2004, 9/11 Commission Report, p. 17: *"Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a commercial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority (a phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense). Exercise planners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors. The threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States—and using them as guided missiles—was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11.98 Not withstanding the identification of these emerging threats, by 9/11 there were only seven alert sites left in the United States, each with two fighter air-craft on alert. This led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORAD was not postured adequately to protect the United States. 99"*

   *) June 17, 2004, Washington Post, 'Transcript: 9/11 Commission Hearings for June 17, 2004' (Gen. Larry Arnold of NORAD, deputy to General Ralph Eberhart): *"ARNOLD: I sure hope that I would never have to come to that. I think it was a reference to United 93. United 93, very shortly, I guess by the time we had heard about it, your staff tells me, because we did not know that, the airplane had already hit the ground up in Pennsylvania thanks to the heroic efforts of those*

passengers that were on board. And the question that came to me was, "What would you have done?" And we were, at that time, seeking presidential authority to shoot that aircraft down as we were flying toward it. So it never came to that point. But it, very typical in intercept, you try to get that airplane, get beside of them, get their attention, see if they respond to you, and based on what had happened earlier -- and we knew what happened earlier, obviously -- the question came to me, "What would you have done?" And using some emergency authorities, and God help me if I'd ever have to do this, we would have given the order to shoot them down. GORTON: And you would have been taking a huge responsibility on yourself in doing that, would you not? ARNOLD: It would have, yes. But at that particular point in time, we fully anticipated that we would get presidential authority."

3. *) September 16, 2001, Sun Sentinel, 'National Guard Jets Raced To Intercept 2 Airliners': *"Offering previously undisclosed details of the military's reaction to the terror attack, Maj. Gen. Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, acknowledged that if the F-15s and F-16s had caught up with the hijacked passenger planes, their mission might have been futile. "What does he do when he gets there? You're not going to get an American pilot shooting down an American airliner," Weaver said. "We don't have permission to do that." Only the president could issue such an order, he confirmed in an impromptu hallway interview at the Pentagon. The Guard planes responded nevertheless, Weaver said, on orders from the Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, N.Y., which had been alerted by the Federal Aviation Administration."*

   *) May 23, 2003, 9/11 Commission, words General Craig McKinley: *"A combat-seasoned and Florida-based Air Force general already carried a far-reaching mission before terrorism became his nation's enemy -- overseeing the air defenses of the continental United States. Now Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold carries orders once unthinkable -- authority to shoot down a commercial airliner. In the aftermath of devastating assaults on the World Trade Center and Pentagon with terrorist-hijacked airliners, the Air Force has handed four strategically positioned generals permission to intercept a threatening airliner if the secretary of defense and the president cannot be consulted in time. "Before, this was unthinkable that we would stop a civilian aircraft," Arnold said... Two of his F-15s took off from Otis Air National Guard Base in Falmouth, Mass., as American Airlines Flight 11 struck the north tower of the World Trade Center on Sept. 11. But they were too late to prevent the second hijacked flight, United Airlines 175, from striking the second tower 15 minutes later. Two F-16s scrambled from Langley Air Force Base in Virginia were too far to prevent American Airlines Flight 77 from hitting the*

Pentagon. "I think everybody is frustrated that we could not have prevented this, but there was nothing that we could have done any better," Arnold told The Associated Press. "Now, we wish we could have stopped it, but that wasn't our mission. Our mission today has changed." In the event that another passenger airplane threatens any city in the 48 contiguous states, Arnold will alert his superior, the four-star general who oversees the North American Aerospace Defense Command, who will alert Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, who will alert President Bush. If time is too short, Arnold and his NORAD superior, Gen. Ralph Eberhart, have authority to shoot."

*) May 23, 2003, 9/11 Commission, words General Craig McKinley: *"There was discussion at that particular time whether or not that aircraft would be shot down. But we, I did not know of presidential shoot down authority until after that aircraft had crashed. ... Subsequent to 9/11, the president delegated to the secretary of Defense, delegated to the combatant commander at NORAD, and now United States Northern Command, has the authority to declare a hostile target."*

*) July 8, 2004, Washington Post, 'Plane That Caused Capitol Evacuation Nearly Shot Down': *"Authority for air patrols to shoot down a civilian aircraft, once limited to the president, has been delegated to the secretary of defense and his deputy; to Eberhart, as NORAD commander; and to the commander of NORAD's continental U.S. region in Florida, Air Force Maj. Gen. Craig R. McKinley. McKinley has said orders to shoot down aircraft are practiced "probably eight to 15 times a week.""*

4. February 9, 2011, Mother Jones, 'On 9/11, Rumsfeld Fiddled While Cheney Ran the Country': *"For a moment, Rumsfeld dropped his generally arrogant stance, and instead looked as if he were about to cry as he recalled the agony he went through in making the decision [to shoot down the planes of 9/11]. It might have been a poignant moment, were it not for the fact that Rumsfeld didn't make the decision. It was Vice President Dick Cheney who made it. And it was Cheney who was running the country that morning, with a confused Rumfeld watching from the sidelines. When the nation is threatened, it is the President, the Commander-in-Chief who must make the decision to engage the military. Under the law, he orders the Secretary of Defense to implement his commands down through the military chain of command. While President Bush was being shuttled around from bunker to bunker on the morning of September 11, 2001, supposedly out of cell phone contact at times, Rumsfeld was next in line. But Rumsfeld's role on 9/11 has always been a mystery. In his new book, on page 339, the former secretary of Defense casts a little light on what he did that morning . Feeling the Pentagon shake when American Airlines Flight 77 hit at 9:38, and seeing the smoke, Rumsfeld, by his own report, rushed into the*

Pentagon parking lot, which was in chaos amid frantic rescue efforts and treating the wounded. Then he returned to his office. He spoke briefly to Bush, who was on Air Force One flying around somewhere in the southeast, who wanted to know about the damage to the Pentagon. From there Rumsfeld went to the military command post in the basement. And there, he writes, heeding the advice of General Dick Myers, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who was also in the room, he raised the threat level to a state of alert, and launched fighters to protect Air Force One. Rumsfeld was supposed to be removed to a secret site, but he says he was "unwilling to be out of touch during the time it would take to relocate me to the safe site." Shortly afterwards, he writes, "the Vice President reached me by phone." Cheney reportedly told Rumsfeld, "There's been at least three instance here where we've had reports of aircraft approaching Washington...A couple were confirmed hijacked. And pursuant to the President's instructions I gave authorization for them to be taken out." In fact, there is considerable doubt as to when Cheney actually received "the President's instructions," and considerable evidence that he acted on his own volition, as even the timid 9/11 Commission report makes clear. But in any case, his orders clearly violated the military chain of command–something Rumsfeld failed to point out, according to his own account of the subsequent conversation."

5. Ibid.
6. 2004, 9/11 Commission report: *"Controllers would notify their supervisors [in case of a hijacking], who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters in Washington. Headquarters had a hijack coordinator [Canavan], who was the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate. If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the [FAA's] hijack coordinator on duty to contact the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD's chain of command.103 The NMCC would keep the FAA hijack coordinator [Canavan] up to date and help the FAA centers coordinate directly with the military."*
7. *) Based on the FAA's Bosten and New York centers contacting NORAD directly.

   *) Ben Sliney statement.
8. *) October 13, 2001, Calgary Herald, 'Norad on Heightened Alert: Role of air defence agency rapidly transformed in wake of Sept. 11 terrorist attacks': *"Today, any aircraft with radio problems is suspect, no problem routine. Fighter jets are scrambled to babysit*

suspect aircraft or "unknowns" three or four times a day. Before Sept. 11, that happened twice a week. Last year, there were 425 unknowns -- pilots who didn't file or diverted from flight plans or used the wrong frequency. Jets were scrambled 129 times."

*) May 3, 1994, United States General Accounting Office, 'Continental Air Defense: A Dedicated Force Is No Longer Needed' (report to congress): *"Overall, during the past 4 years, NORAD's alert fighters took off to intercept aircraft (referred to as scrambled) 1,518 times, or an average of 15 times per site per year. Of these incidents, the number of suspected drug smuggling aircraft averaged one per site, or less than 7 percent of all of the alert sites' total activity. [3] The remaining activity generally involved visually inspecting unidentified aircraft and assisting aircraft in distress. Appendix I contains additional information on the scramble activity at each air defense unit and alert site and on the continental air defense and air sovereignty missions."*

*) History Commons, 'Context of '1990-2001: NORAD Regularly Launches Fighters to Intercept Suspicious Aircraft before 9/11'': *"1990-2001: NORAD Regularly Launches Fighters to Intercept Suspicious Aircraft before 9/11 Edit event Edit event Captain Tom Herring, an F-15 pilot with the Florida Air National Guard.Captain Tom Herring, an F-15 pilot with the Florida Air National Guard. [Source: Airman]Fighter jets are regularly scrambled by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in response to suspicious or unidentified aircraft flying in US airspace in the years preceding 9/11. [General Accounting Office, 5/3/1994, pp. 4; Associated Press, 8/14/2002] For this task, NORAD keeps a pair of fighters on "alert" at a number of sites around the US. These fighters are armed, fueled, and ready to take off within minutes of receiving a scramble order (see Before September 11, 2001). [American Defender, 4/1998; Air Force Magazine, 2/2002; Bergen Record, 12/5/2003; Grant, 2004, pp. 14] Various accounts offer statistics about the number of times fighters are scrambled: bullet A General Accounting Office report published in May 1994 states that "during the past four years, NORAD's alert fighters took off to intercept aircraft (referred to as scrambled) 1,518 times, or an average of 15 times per site per year." Of these incidents, the number of scrambles that are in response to suspected drug smuggling aircraft averages "one per site, or less than 7 percent of all of the alert sites' total activity." The remaining activity, about 93 percent of the total scrambles, "generally involved visually inspecting unidentified aircraft and assisting aircraft in distress." [General Accounting Office, 5/3/1994, pp. 4] bullet In the two years from May 15, 1996 to May 14, 1998, NORAD's Western Air Defense Sector (WADS), which is responsible for the "air sovereignty" of the western 63 percent of the continental US, scrambles fighters 129 times to identify*

unknown aircraft that might be a threat. Over the same period, WADS scrambles fighters an additional 42 times against potential and actual drug smugglers. [Washington National Guard, 1998] bullet In 1997, the Southeast Air Defense Sector (SEADS)—another of NORAD's three air defense sectors in the continental US—tracks 427 unidentified aircraft, and fighters intercept these "unknowns" 36 times. The same year, NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) handles 65 unidentified tracks and WADS handles 104 unidentified tracks, according to Major General Larry Arnold, the commander of the Continental United States NORAD Region on 9/11. [American Defender, 4/1998] bullet In 1998, SEADS logs more than 400 fighter scrambles. [Grant, 2004, pp. 14] bullet In 1999, Airman magazine reports that NORAD's fighters on alert at Homestead Air Reserve Base in Florida are scrambled 75 times per year, on average. According to Captain Tom Herring, a full-time alert pilot at the base, this is more scrambles than any other unit in the Air National Guard. [Airman, 12/1999] bullet General Ralph Eberhart, the commander of NORAD on 9/11, will later state that in the year 2000, NORAD's fighters fly 147 sorties. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004 pdf file] bullet According to the Calgary Herald, in 2000 there are 425 "unknowns," where an aircraft's pilot has not filed or has deviated from a flight plan, or has used the wrong radio frequency, and fighters are scrambled 129 times in response. [Calgary Herald, 10/13/2001] bullet Between September 2000 and June 2001, fighters are scrambled 67 times to intercept suspicious aircraft, according to the Associated Press. [Associated Press, 8/14/2002] Lieutenant General Norton Schwartz, the commander of the Alaskan NORAD Region at the time of the 9/11 attacks, will say that before 9/11, it is "not unusual, and certainly was a well-refined procedure" for NORAD fighters to intercept an aircraft. He will add, though, that intercepting a commercial airliner is "not normal." [Air Force Magazine, 9/2011 pdf file] On September 11, 2001, NEADS scrambles fighters that are kept on alert in response to the hijackings (see 8:46 a.m. September 11, 2001 and 9:24 a.m. September 11, 2001). [New York Times, 10/16/2001; 9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 20, 26-27]"

9. May 23, 2003, 9/11 Commission, interview with General Craig McKinley, representing NORAD, p. 26: *"MR. BEN-VENISTE: My question is: The concept of terrorists using airplanes as weapons was not something which was unknown to the U.S. intelligence community on September 10th, 2001, isn't that fair to say? ... [McKinley claimed this information was not available to NORAD] ... Well, let's start, for example, with September 12th, 1994, a Cessna 150L crashed into the South Lawn of the White House, barely missing the building, and killing the pilot. Similarly, in December of 1994, an Algerian armed Islamic group of terrorists hijacked an Air*

France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. In October of 1996, the intelligence community obtained information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and crash it into Tel Aviv. In August of 1988, the intelligence community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. The information was passed on to the FBI and the FAA. In September of 1998, the intelligence community obtained information that Osama bin Laden's next operation could possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it. In August 2001, the intelligence community obtained information regarding a plot to either bomb the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi from an airplane, or crash an airplane into it. In addition, in the Atlanta Olympics, the United States government and the Department of Justice and my colleague Jamie Gorelick were involved in planning against possible terrorist attacks at the Olympics, which included the potential of an aircraft flying into the stadium. In July 2001, the G-8 summit in Genoa, attended by our president, among the measures that were taken were positioning surface-to-air missile ringing Genoa, closing the Genoa airport and restricting all airspace over Genoa. Was not this information, sir, available to NORAD as of September 11th, 2001?"

*) 2004, 9/11 Commission Report, p. 561: *"As part of his 34-page analysis,the attorney explained why he thought that a fueled Boeing 747, used as a weapon,"must be considered capable of destroying virtually any building located anywhere in the world." DOJ memo, Robert D.to Cathleen C., "Aerial Intercepts and Shoot-downs: Ambiguities of Law and Practical Considerations," Mar. 30, 2000, p. 10. Also, in February 1974, a man named Samuel Byck attempted to commandeer a plane at Baltimore Washington International Airport with the intention of forcing the pilots to fly into Washington and crash into the White House to kill the president. The man was shot by police and then killed himself on the aircraft while it was still on the ground at the airport."*

10. May 23, 2003, 9/11 Commission, interview with General Michael Canavan, representing the FAA: *"Here's my answer -- and it's not to duck the question. Number one, I was visiting the airport in San Juan that day when this happened. That was a CADEX airport, and I was down there also to remove someone down there that was in a key position. So when 9/11 happened, that's where I was. I was able to get back to Washington that evening on a special flight from the Army back from San Juan, back to Washington. So everything that transpired that day in terms of times, I have to -- and I have no information on that now, because when I got back we weren't -- that wasn't the issue at the time. We were - - when I got back it was,*

What are we going to do over the next 48 hours to strengthen what just happened?"

11. *) November 4, 2003, 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the record (Commission Sensitive), General Mike Canavan interview, p. 1: *"[U] Canavan was asked if he recalled a Table Top exercise conducted by the FAA when he first arrived at the FAA in 2000 involving a Fed Ex plane being commandeered by a suicide hijacker. Canavan did not recall such an exercise and shared that it must have been at a pretty low level since he didn't recall."*

    *) History Commons, 'October 16-23, 2000: NORAD Exercise Includes Scenarios of Attempted Suicide Plane Crashes into UN Headquarters in New York': *"The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) practices scenarios based around suicidal pilots planning to deliberately crash stolen aircraft into the United Nations headquarters—a skyscraper in New York. The two scenarios are practiced on October 16 and October 23 as part of NORAD's annual command post exercise called Vigilant Guardian. All of NORAD, including its Northeast Air Defense Sector based in Rome, New York, participates in this exercise. [US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 8/17/2004; Arkin, 2005, pp. 545; GlobalSecurity (.org), 4/27/2005] Simulation Involves Planned Suicide Plane Attack - General Richard Myers, currently the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will later describe the scenario practiced on October 16: "Due to recent arrests involving illegal drug trafficking in Maine, an individual steals a Federal Express plane and plans a suicide attack into the United Nations building in New York City." In response to the simulated crisis, exercise participants follow hijack checklists, exercise command and control, and coordinate with external agencies. Simulation Involves WMD Directed at the UN - The October 23 scenario, according to Myers, is based around "[w]eapons of mass destruction directed at the United Nations. An individual steals a Federal Express aircraft and plans a suicide attack on the United Nations building in New York City." In response, exercise participants practice command and control, and coordinate with external agencies, and fighter jets conduct an interception of the stolen aircraft. [US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 8/17/2004] Federal Express currently flies mostly the DC-10 and the MD-11, which are both large jet planes, so presumably one of these kinds of aircraft is considered in the exercise scenarios. [Washington Post, 1/17/2001] The UN headquarters building—the target in the scenarios—is a 39-story high-rise, located just a few miles from the World Trade Center. [New York Daily News, 12/2/1999; Evening Standard, 9/11/2002] Scenarios Revealed in 2004 - The details of these two scenarios will come to light in August 2004 during a hearing of the Senate Armed*

Services Committee. They will be revealed by Myers, at that time the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after Senator Mark Dayton (D-MN) asks him, "Did NORAD conduct exercises or develop scenarios, prior to September 11, 2001, to test a military reaction to an aircraft hijacking which appeared destined to result in a suicide crash into a high-value target?" [US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services, 8/17/2004] NORAD will state in 2004 that, until 9/11, it conducts four major exercises each year. Most of these include a hijack scenario, but not all of them involve planes being used as weapons. [USA Today, 4/18/2004; CNN, 4/19/2004] NORAD's next Vigilant Guardian exercise, in 2001, will actually be several days underway on 9/11 (see (6:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001). It will include a number of scenarios based around plane hijackings, with the fictitious hijackers targeting New York in at least one of those scenarios (see September 6, 2001, September 9, 2001, September 10, 2001, and (9:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [9/11 Commission, 2004; Vanity Fair, 8/1/2006]"

12. *) 2004, 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 112-113: *"Bin Ladin himself was most likely to sleep. Working with the tribals, they drew up plans for the raid. They ran two complete rehearsals in the United States during the fall of 1997.18 By early 1998, planners at the [Cofer Black's CIA] Counterterrorist Center were ready to come back to the White House to seek formal approval. Tenet apparently walked National Security Advisor Sandy Berger through the basic plan on February 13. One group of tribals would subdue the guards, enter Tarnak Farms stealthily, grab Bin Ladin, take him to a desert site outside Kandahar, and turn him over to a second group.This second group of tribals would take him to a desert landing zone already tested in the 1997 Kansi capture. From there, a CIA plane would take him to New York, an Arab capital, or wherever he was to be arraigned. Briefing papers prepared by the Counterterrorist Center acknowledged that hitches might develop. People might be killed, and Bin Ladin's supporters might retaliate,perhaps taking U.S.citizens in Kandahar hostage.But the briefing papers also noted that there was risk in not acting."Sooner or later," they said,"Bin Ladin will attack U.S.interests,perhaps using WMD [weapons of mass destruction]."19 ... "Mike" [Canavan] thought the capture plan was "the perfect operation." It required minimum infrastructure.The plan had now been modified so that the tribals would keep Bin Ladin in a hiding place for up to a month before turning him over to the United States —thereby increasing the chances of keeping the U.S. hand out of sight."Mike" trusted the information from the Afghan network; it had been corroborated by other means,he told us.The lead CIA officer in the field, Gary Schroen, also had confidence in the tribals. In a May 6 cable to CIA headquarters, he pronounced their planning "almost as professional and detailed . . . as would be done by any U.S.*

military special operations element." He and the other officers who had worked through the plan with the tribals judged it "about as good as it can be." (By that, Schroen explained, he meant that the chance of capturing or killing Bin Ladin was about 40 percent.) ... Military officers reviewed the capture plan and, according to "Mike," "found no showstoppers."The commander of Delta Force felt "uncomfortable" with having the tribals hold Bin Ladin captive for so long,and the commander of Joint Special Operations Forces, Lieutenant General Michael Canavan, was worried about the safety of the tribals inside Tarnak Farms. General Canavan said he had actually thought the operation too complicated for the CIA..."

*) November 4, 2003, 9/11 Commission, Memorandum for the record (Commission Sensitive), General Mike Canavan interview, p. 5: *"[U] Canavan doesn't remember hearing any problems about the ability of FAA's liaisons with the IC to obtain the access and information they needed. He said he talked personally to Cofer Black and Dale Watson and told them just to give FAA everything that had anything to do with aviation. They agreed to do so. Canavan said he took it on "good faith" that this was what was happening."*

13. May 23, 2003, 9/11 Commission, interview with General Michael Canavan, representing the FAA: *"Here's my answer -- and it's not to duck the question. Number one, I was visiting the airport in San Juan that day when this happened. That was a CADEX airport, and I was down there also to remove someone down there that was in a key position. So when 9/11 happened, that's where I was. I was able to get back to Washington that evening on a special flight from the Army back from San Juan, back to Washington. So everything that transpired that day in terms of times, I have to -- and I have no information on that now, because when I got back we weren't -- that wasn't the issue at the time. We were - - when I got back it was, What are we going to do over the next 48 hours to strengthen what just happened?"*
14. *) 2004, 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 331, 558: *"Rice chaired a Principals Committee meeting on September 13 in the Situation Room to refine how the fight against al Qaeda would be conducted. The principals agreed that the overall message should be that anyone supporting al Qaeda would risk harm. The United States would need to integrate diplomacy, financial measures, intelligence, and military actions into an over-arching strategy.The principals also focused on Pakistan and what it could do to turn the Taliban against al Qaeda.They concluded that if Pakistan decided not to help the United States, it too would be at risk.36 The same day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage [and Cofer Black] met with the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, and the visiting head of Pakistan's military intelligence service ,Mahmud*

Ahmed. ... Pakistan made its decision swiftly. That afternoon, Secretary of State Powell announced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terrorism. ... 36. NSC memo, Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee Meeting Held on September 13, 2001. In addition to the usual members of President Bush's war cabinet, Secretary of Transportation Mineta and FAA security chief Canavan also attended."

*) History Commons, 'September 13, 2001: CIA Presents President with Plan to Confront Global Terrorism; Claims Victory Can Be Achieved in Weeks': *"CIA Director George Tenet and Cofer Black, the director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, meet at 9:30 a.m. in the White House Situation Room with President Bush and the National Security Council. Tenet presents a plan for tracking down Osama bin Laden, toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan, and confronting terrorism worldwide. According to journalist Bob Woodward, the plan involves "bringing together expanded intelligence-gathering resources, sophisticated technology, agency paramilitary teams and opposition forces in Afghanistan in a classic covert action. They would then be combined with US military power and Special Forces into an elaborate and lethal package designed to destroy the shadowy terrorist networks." A key concept is to utilize the Northern Alliance, which is the main opposition force in Afghanistan. Despite being "a strained coalition of sometimes common interests," Tenet says that along with the CIA teams "and tons of money, the Alliance could be brought together into a cohesive fighting force." Black gives a presentation describing the effectiveness of covert action. He says they will need to go after the Taliban as well as al-Qaeda, as the two are joined at the hip. He wants the mission to begin as soon as possible, and adds, "When we're through with them, they will have flies walking across their eyeballs." Black claims that once they are on the ground, victory could be achieved in weeks. According to Bob Woodward, "No one else in the room, including Tenet, believed that was possible." Black also warns the president, "Americans are going to die.... How many, I don't know. Could be a lot." Bush responds, "That's war. That's what we're here to win." This is the second presentation laying out an increasingly detailed set of CIA proposals for expanding its fight against terrorism. (George Tenet had given the first when he met with the president the day before (see September 12, 2001).) Tenet will give a more detailed presentation of the CIA's covert action plan two days later, at Camp David (see September 15, 2001). [Woodward, 2002, pp. 50-53; Washington Post, 1/29/2002; Kessler, 2003, pp. 233-234]"*

15. May 23, 2003, 9/11 Commission, interview with General Michael Canavan, representing the FAA.

16. Businessweek.com, 'Executive Profile: Michael A. Canavan': *"Mr. Michael A. Canavan (Retired) served as Group President, Information Systems Group of Anteon International Corp.(General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc.) since June 2004. Lieutenant General. Canavan served as Group Senior Vice President for Homeland Security of General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc. (also known as Anteon International Corp.) since August 11, 2003. Lieutenant General. Canavan headed Anteon's homeland security and counter terrorism programs, including intelligence data sharing, emergency first-responder communications and urban warfare training. Prior to joining Anteon, he served as Bechtel Corporation's Assistant General Manager for Counter Terrorism. In this capacity, he was responsible for leading and managing all of its counter terrorism activities, including training, exercises, testing and evaluation, and technology development. In 2001, he served as Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), where he was responsible for the development and administration of policies, programs, standards and regulations of the U.S. civil aviation security worldwide. In 1966, he enlisted in the U.S. Army for 34 years and served as a Combat Engineer, retiring as a Lieutenant General, United States Army. He held a variety of Command and Staff positions in Vietnam (two tours), Thailand, Germany (three tours), the Republic of Korea and the United States. He served with the following units: 10th Special Forces Group, 5th Special Forces Group, 6th Special Forces Group, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Joint Casualty Resolution Center, 9th Infantry Division, ROTC Command, 82nd Airborne Division (two tours), XVIII Airborne Corps, 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Special Operations Command (two tours) and the 7th Infantry Division (Light). He has served in the following company and field grade assignments: Special Forces "A" Detachment Commander, Special Forces Company Commander, Headquarters Company Commander, Rifle Company Commander, Assistant Professor of Military Science, S3 Operations Officer, Battalion Executive Officer, Corps Chief of Current Operations, Corps Deputy Chief of Staff, Infantry Battalion Commander, J3 Director of Operations, and Infantry Brigade Commander. He was later commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Infantry upon graduation from the Infantry Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Georgia. Lieutenant General Canavan retired from active duty on 1 January 2001. During his career, he served in a number of key positions, including: Chief of Staff, European Command; Commander, Special Operations Command, Europe; and Commander, Joint Special Operations Command. As Chief of Staff, European Command, he was responsible for day-to-day*

coordination and operations of a 1,400-person staff overseeing 100,000 U.S. forces throughout Europe, the Middle East and Africa. He has been a Director of USfalcon, Inc. (known as Mill City Connections, Inc.) since 2006. Lieutenant General. Canavan earned a bachelor's degree from Saint Martins College and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.LTGUSARet."

17. November 7, 2001, The Guardian, 'FBI claims Bin Laden inquiry was frustrated; Officials told to 'back off' on Saudis before September 11'.
18. February 8, 2008, UPI, 'Making cyberwar on bin Laden'.
19. October 1, 2002, Die Zeit, 'Tödliche Fehler'
20. September 15, 2001, The Telegraph, 'Israeli security issued urgent warning to CIA of large-scale terror attacks.'
21. October 2, 2002, Oliver Schrom for Die Zeit, 'Next Door to Mohammed Atta: Israeli agents were living in Florida and tailing the future death pilots – until their cover was blown.' ('Tür an Tür mit Mohammed Atta: Auf der Jagd nach den späteren Todespiloten quartierten sich israelische Spione in Florida ein - bis die Agenten enttarnt wurden'). Article in German and English in PDF form.
22. *) March 7, 2002, Seattle Times, 'U.S. officials dismiss report of Israeli spies'.

    *) March 7, 2002, Telegraph, 'US arrests 200 young Israelis in spying investigation' (more elaborate report): *"The leaked report was compiled by the Drug Enforcement Administration after some of its offices were allegedly targeted by Israelis posing as art students. "That these people are now travelling in the US selling art seems not to fit their background," the DEA report said."*
23. *) ncix.gov/archives/nacic/news/2001/mar01.html (accessed: February 6, 2005): *"In the past six weeks, employees in federal office buildings located throughout the United States have reported suspicious activities connected with individuals representing themselves as foreign students selling or delivering artwork. ... Other reporting indicates that there may be two groups involved, and they refer to themselves as "Israeli art students.""*

    *) March 7, 2002, Telegraph, 'US arrests 200 young Israelis in spying investigation' (over the past year): *"None of the Israelis, about 140 of whom are believed to have been detained before the September 11 attacks, has been charged and most have been deported, according to the US government."*

    *) March 15, 2002, Forward, 'Spy Rumors Fly on Gusts of Truth': *"Far from pointing to Israeli spying against U.S. government and military facilities, as reported in Europe last week, the incidents in question appear to represent a case of Israelis in the United States spying on a common enemy, radical Islamic networks suspected of links to Middle East terrorism. ...*

    A counterintelligence investigation by the FBI concluded that at least two of [the Urban Moving System employees] were in fact

Mossad operatives, according to the former American official..."
*) October 29, 2007, Salon, 'The Israeli "art student" mystery': *"For almost two years, hundreds of young Israelis falsely claiming to be art students haunted federal offices -- in particular, the DEA. No one knows why -- and no one seems to want to find out."*

24. October 2, 2002, Oliver Schrom for Die Zeit, 'Next Door to Mohammed Atta: Israeli agents were living in Florida and tailing the future death pilots – until their cover was blown.' ('Tür an Tür mit Mohammed Atta: Auf der Jagd nach den späteren Todespiloten quartierten sich israelische Spione in Florida ein - bis die Agenten enttarnt wurden'). Article in German and English in PDF form.
25. June 18, 2004, New York Times, 'Panel Says Chaos in Administration Was Wide on 9/11': *"Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, the commander of Norad, testified to the commission that had information about the hijackings been passed along faster from the F.A.A. - and had there been an immediate shoot-down order - fighter jets could have intercepted and shot down most or all of the hijacked planes, a statement that was received by commission members with skepticism. "I'm assuming that they told us, F.A.A. told us as soon as they knew," General Eberhart said. The staff report included an exhaustive minute-by-minute re-creation of the morning of the attacks, showing that there had never been a hope of intercepting and shooting down the planes before they hit their targets because of communication gaps between Norad and the F.A.A., which prevented armed fighter jets from being scrambled fast enough. The timeline demonstrated that the last of the four planes had crashed before Mr. Cheney ordered the shoot downs. The report found, as the panel has indicated before, that a passenger uprising aboard United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed into a field in Pennsylvania, was what had prevented the plane from reaching its intended target in Washington. "The nation owes a debt to the passengers of United 93," the staff wrote."*
26. *) Live video of Condoleeza Rice press conference, as can be seen in 'Loose Change: Final Edition' (2007), 14:00:
BOB DACY, RESEARCHER AND TV HOST OF THE SIMPLE TRUTH: *"On page 172 of your report, the 9/11 report, U.S. government has not been able to determine the origin of the money used in the 9/11 attacks. Ultimately the question is of little practical significance." How can you state that the question of who bankrolled the deaths of 3,000 American people on September 11th is, quote, "of little practical significance"?"*
THOMAS KEAN: *"Because it cost so little money. That's the awful thing about it. It cost less than $500,000, which is why it was so hard to trace. We were able to find pieces of the $500,000, but it came in very small pieces."*This, of course, is nonsense.

KEVIN SMITH OF INFOWARS: *"And you said earlier "$500,000 to do the 9/11 operation," while we know that $100,000 was wired to Mohammed Atta directly from the head of Pakistani ISI."*

THOMAS KEAN: *"Well, I'm not aware of the $100,000 wired to Mohammed Atta, but Pakistan, I think, is the most dangerous country in the world."*

27. *) Live video of Condoleeza Rice press conference, as can be seen in 'Loose Change: Final Edition' (2007), 13:00:

PAKISTANI OR INDIAN REPORTER: *"Are you aware of the reports at the time that ISI chief was in Washington on 9/11 and on September 10th, $100,000 was wired from Pakistan to these groups here in this area? And while he was here, was he meeting with you or anybody in the administration?"*

CONDOLEEZE RICE: *"I have not seen that report and he was certainly not meeting with me."*

*) May 16, 2002, White House press release, 'National Security Advisor Holds Press Briefing': *"Are you aware of the reports at the time that - was in Washington on 9/11 and on September 10th, $100,000 was wired* ***to*** *Pakistan to these groups here in this area? And while he was here, was he meeting with you or anybody in the administration?"* In the video the interviewer cleary says **from** Pakistan to these groups.

ORIGINAL NEWS REPORTS:

*) September 10, 2001, Amir Mateen for News Pakistan, 'ISI Chief's Parleys Continue in Washington': *"ISI Chief Lt-Gen. Mahmoud's week-long presence in Washington has triggered speculation about the agenda of his mysterious meetings at the Pentagon and National Security Council. Officially, he is on a routine visit in return to CIA Director George Tenet's earlier visit to Islamabad. Official sources confirm that he met Tenet this week. He also held long parleys unspecified officials at the White House and the Pentagon. But the most important meeting was with Marc Grossman, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. one can safely guess that the discussions must have centered around Afghanistan ... and Osama bin Laden. What added interest to his visit is the history of such visits. Last time Ziauddin Butt, Mahmoud's predecessor, was here, during Nawz Sharif's government, the domestic politics turned topsy-turvy within days. [On September 9 Northern Alliance head general Massood already was assassinated]."*

*) September 30, 2001, ABC News: *"As to September 11th, federal authorities have told ABC News they have now tracked more than $100,000 from banks in Pakistan, to two banks in Florida to accounts held by suspected ring leader, Mohammed Atta. As well ... "Time Magazine" is reporting that some of the money came in the days just before the attack and can be traced directly to people connected to Osama bin Laden. It's all part of what has been a*

successful FBI effort so far to close in on the hijacker's high commander, the money men, the planners and the mastermind."

*) October 8, 2001, Dawn (Pakistan), 'Gen. Mahmud's exit due to links with Umar Sheikh': *"Director General of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed has been replaced after the FBI investigators established credible links between him and Umar Sheikh, one of the three militants released in exchange for passengers of the hijacked Indian Airlines plane in 1999. The FBI team, which had sought adequate inputs about various terrorists including Sheikh from the intelligence agencies, was working on the linkages between Sheikh and former ISI chief Gen Mahmud which are believed to have been substantiated, reports PTI website [most likely Press Trust of India]. Informed sources said there were enough indications with the US intelligence agencies that it was at Gen Mahmud's instruction that Sheikh had transferred 100,000 US dollars into the account of Mohammed Atta, one of the lead terrorists in strikes at the World Trade Centre on Sept 11, it adds."* The Wall Street Journal in 'Our Friends the Pakistanis' copied the information later this day.

*) October 9, 2001, Times of India, 'India helped FBI trace ISI-terrorist links': *"New Delhi: While the Pakistani Inter Services public relations claimed that former ISI Director-General Lt-Gen Mahmud Ahmad sought retirement after being superseded on Monday, the truth is more shocking. Top sources confirmed here on Tuesday, that the General lost his job because of the "evidence" India produced to show his links to one of the suicide bombers that wrecked the World Trade Centre. The US authorities sought his removal after confirming the fact that $100,000 were wired to WTC hijacker Mohammed Atta from Pakistan by Ahmad Umar Sheikh at the instance of Gen Mahumd. Senior government sources have confirmed that India contributed significantly to establishing the link between the money transfer and the role played by the dismissed ISI chief. While they did not provide details, they said that Indian inputs, including Sheikh's mobile phone number, helped the FBI in tracing and establishing the link. A direct link between the ISI and the WTC attack could have enormous repercussions. The US cannot but suspect whether or not there were other senior Pakistani army commanders who were in the know of things. Evidence of a larger conspiracy could shake US confidence in Pakistan's ability to participate in the anti-terrorism coalition. Indian officials say they are vitally interested in the unravelling of the case since it could link the ISI directly to the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Kathmandu-Delhi flight to Kandahar last December. Ahmad Umar Sayeed Sheikh is a British national and a London School of Economics graduate who was arrested by the police in Delhi following a bungled 1994*

kidnapping of four westerners, including an American citizen." The Wall Street Journal in 'Our Friends the Pakistanis' copied the information later this day.

*) October 10, 2001, Agence France Presse (AFP), 'India Accuses Ex Pakistan Spy Chief Of Links to US Attacker: Report': *"Former Pakistani intelligence chief Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad was sacked after arch rival India said it had provided evidence linking him to the US terror attacks, a report said Wednesday. The Times of India newspaper reported the general lost his job after India said he had ordered money to be wired to Mohammed Atta who hijacked one of the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center in New York on September 11. ... A highly-placed government source told AFP that the damning "damning link" between the general and the transfer of funds to Atta was part of evidence which India has officially sent to the US. "The evidence we have supplied to the U.S. is of much wider range and depth than just one piece of paper linking a rogue general to some misplaced act of terrorism.""*

*) April 21, 2002, Sunday Times, 'The British Jackal': *"It would appear that the ISI had its own reasons for holding Sheikh for a week before announcing to the world that he was in custody. One thing it would have wanted to do was to make sure that its protege did not give more away than absolutely necessary about his relationship with Pakistan's intelligence services. This "missing week" shed new light on unsubstantiated Indian reports last October that Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed, director-general of the ISI, had been forced into retirement after FBI investigators uncovered credible links between him and Sheikh in the wake of September 11. According to these reports, the FBI team established that in early September, Ahmed had instructed Sheikh to transfer $ 100,000 to Mohammed Atta, leader of the hijackers who crashed into the World Trade Center."*

*) December 12, 2008, ISI General Hamid Gul (a 9/11 Truther, major terrorist sponsor and nuclear antagonist) on the Alex Jones Show: *"Not at all [was Gen. Mahmud Ahmed involved in wiring $100,000 to the 9/11 hijackers]. Mahmud is a friend of mine. I met him very recently in Lahore, and he categorically denies this. I think this is all disinformation, which has been adopted a very sophisticated intelligence art."*

SEPARATE CHANNEL OF FINANCING FROM UAE:

*) November 12, 2001, Wall Street Journal, 'Informal Money-Movement System in UAE is Likely Uncontrollable': *"Last year [2000], a total of more than $110,000 was transferred from a UAE exchange house via Citibank in New York to a SunTrust Banks Inc. account in Florida jointly held by two of the suspected hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi. And in the days before the attacks, three of the suspected hijackers sent a total of about*

$15,000 back to the UAE, where a suspected lieutenant of Mr. bin Laden's collected it and then fled the country. Two of the transfers - one for $5,000 and one for $5,400 - were sent from Western Union outlets in Boston. They were collected at a branch of the Al Ansari Exchange in Sharjah, according to Mohammed Al Ansari, the company's managing director. Since then, the UAE has criminalized money laundering." These funds were sent by Ammar Al Baluchi, a.k.a. Abdul Aziz Ali, in chunks on July 9, August 7, August 30 and September 18, 2000. They are different from the $100,000 transfer from Pakistan on behalf of Saeed Sheikh and ISI General Mahmud Ahmed in 2001, right before 9/11.

28. March 23, 2004, Democracy Now!, '"The White House Has Played Cover-Up"–Former 9/11 Commission Member Max Cleland Blasts Bush' (transcript of the words of Max Cleland): *"Well, first of all, let's look at what Richard Clarke has said. That's the man in the White House serving four Presidents, three Republicans and one Democrat, the man responsible for monitoring terrorist activity and threats to the United States. He has come out with a scathing indictment of President Bush, saying he has handled the problem terribly because he had an obsession, basically, he and his top advisers, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, with Iraq. Not an obsession with Osama bin Laden and the terrorist cadre that was increasingly being formed in the 1990's that is responsible, we now know, for the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, killing 17 sailors, or an increasing number of attacks and then ultimately the attack on 9-11. And yet this administration has chosen to focus on Iraq, not al Qaeda. Why? I think that is why the 9-11 commission has been dissed because if you really go into it, you really go into 9-11. You realize that this government had more information at its disposal and, in many ways, failed to understand the threat from al Qaeda, or discounted people like George Tenet who, from 1998 on, said that we were at war with al Qaeda. So, what happens here is that the real information that we did have from the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. about al Qaeda was relatively dissed and then Cheney and others went to the C.I.A. and said, look, give us the information that we really want. Richard Clarke recounts in his book that the 12th of September, after Condoleezza Rice had put Richard Clarke in charge of the emergency response in the situation room. The next day Richard Clarke goes in the situation room and they're all talking about Iraq, not al Qaeda. Why is that? Why would the President continue to insist without any shred of evidence to connect Saddam Hussein with this attack? And why would Rumsfeld, on the day of the attacks, September 11, as revealed by Bob Woodward's book "Bush at War" published two years ago, in his handwritten notes, say put it all together, tie it all together? Because they had a predisposition*

back to 1992 to go to war with Iraq. Why? Because I think the Neocons, the Right-wing in America, felt that president Bush I got beaten primarily because he didn't take out Saddam Hussein because — so that became the real litmus test for foreign policy for the Neocons and for the Right wing. And once Bush got elected and Cheney was Vice President and Rumsfeld was Secretary of Defense and Wolfowitz was the number two in the Department of Defense, the Cheney-Wolfowitz plan dating from 1992, to take out Saddam Hussein became the operative foreign policy agenda. Item number one. We now know from secretary O'Neill, a Republican, who was Treasury Secretary under George Bush for a while, that within 10 days of the inauguration of President Bush, he was talking about invading Iraq. So, now if we really examine 9-11, we find that this administration, President Bush, has used 9-11 and the tragedy to this country and to the families in this country, the over 3,000 people who were lost, used that as an excuse to go after Saddam Hussein, not a reason to create the war in Iraq. So, they created a war that they were already predisposed to do and 9-11 gave them the excuse. That is why Osama bin Laden is still on the loose. That is why Osama bin Laden and his terrorist cadre are still blowing up people by the hundreds most recently in Spain, which changed that government and now Spain is withdrawing from Iraq. I mean, we have a killer and killer organization on the loose and this President has chosen another course to pursue because of his own predilections to I guess avenge his father or follow the Neocon path that Saddam Hussein was the real enemy. The real enemy is Al Qaeda and that's what the 9-11 commission will increasingly find in testimony and they will increasingly find that this government had more information about Al Qaeda from the FBI, dating back to 1994 that planes were planned to be used to hit major targets like big buildings. And if you follow the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Al Qaeda in many ways was behind that and why — why — they didn't take their eye off the ball."